## Online Appendix:

## Competing for Loyalists?

# $\begin{tabular}{ll} How Party Positioning Affects Populist Radical Right Voting \\ & Comparative Political Studies \end{tabular}$

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## A Panel Survey Data

#### A.1 Survey Administration

The Respondi panel covers the online, 18+ German population. Our initial sample (wave 1) was sampled from Respondi's panel to be nationally representative on age, gender, and state. Respondi's quality standards, along with further details on their sampling methodology, are reported below:

Membership and participation are voluntary and follow a double opt-in registration process. The panel is actively and centrally managed by a professional panel team. In order to ensure a high standard of quality, the panel undergoes a continuous quality control process using a thorough scoring and controlling system. Since we recruit via our own opinion platforms and the telephone, the focus is on intrinsic motivation thus preventing sample bias due to "professional" respondents. A guaranteed panel response rate of 60% within the first seven days serves as proof of this high standard of quality (Respondi, "Quality Standards").

Our panel survey design was archived in the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) repository (#20170321AA). As the project evolved, we introduced the conjoint experiment in Wave 4 to gain additional leverage on our research questions. Please note, however, that the conjoint experiment in this paper was not pre-registered.

Our panel survey consisted of 4 waves, with the first wave consisting of 3435 respondents. We added fresh samples in each wave, both to avoid panel conditioning and to maintain the per-wave sample size at close to 3000. We also embedded a simple attention check every wave and analyze only observations that passed this check. Our 15-month panel lasted from September 2016 to December 2017, bracketing the German federal election in September 2017. In each wave, we retained about 70% of respondents from each previous wave. Around 44% of respondents participated in all four waves.

Wave	Date	Sample Size	Fresh Sample	Sample Size (Analyze)
Wave 1	09/05/2016 - 09/23/2016	3435	_	3419
Wave 2	01/04/2017 - 01/17/2017	2907	10.3~%	2883
Wave 3	06/19/2017 - 06/30/2017	3538	38.7~%	3274
Wave 4	12/07/2017 - 12/22/2017	3083	23.1~%	3019

Table A.1.1: Sampling Design.

	Until Wave 1	Until Wave 2	Until Wave 3	Until Wave 4
From Wave 1	100	75.9	58.0	44.2
From Wave 2	_	100	74.6	56.3
From Wave 3	_	_	100	67.0
From Wave 4	_	_	_	100

Table A.1.2: Attrition Rate.

#### A.2 Survey Question Wording

• "Vote intention if elections on Sunday"

If the federal elections were held this Sunday, which party would you vote for? Please answer this question even if you are not entitled to vote. This information is very important for the scientific analysis of our study. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and will remain anonymous.

- 1. CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union/ Christlich Soziale Union)
- 2. SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
- 3. Die Linke
- 4. Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen
- 5. FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands)
- 6. AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)
- 7. Piraten Partei
- 8. NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
- 9. FW (Freie Wähler)
- 10. Tierschutzpartei
- 11. ÖDP (Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei)
- 12. Republikaner
- 13. Other [write in]
- 14. I would not vote
- 15. Don't know
- 16. No answer
- "Closeness to parties"

There are many political parties in Germany. How close do you feel to the following parties? Use a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means that you do not at all feel close to a party, and 100 means that you feel very close to the party. (Note: "no answer" was an option for each slider)

- 1. CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union) (slider 0-100)
- 2. CSU (Christlich Soziale Union) (slider 0-100)
- 3. SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) (slider 0-100)
- 4. AfD (Alternative fr Deutschland) (slider 0-100)
- 5. Die Linke (slider 0-100)
- 6. Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen (slider 0-100)
- 7. FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands) (slider 0-100)
- 8. NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) (slider 0-100)
- 9. Republikaner (slider 0-100)
- "Established parties listening to concerns about refugees"

And do you think that the established parties are listening to the German publics' concerns in relation to the inflow of refugees? When it comes to the inflow of refugeess, established parties:

- 1. Listen carefully
- 2. Listen somewhat
- 3. Don't tend to listen
- 4. Don't listen at all

to the concerns of German citizens.

• "Party best able to handle refugee crisis"

Germany has been receiving large numbers of refugees. What party do you think is best able to handle the refugee issue?

- 1. CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union / Christlich Soziale Union)
- 2. SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
- 3. Die Linke
- 4. Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen
- 5. FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands)
- 6. AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)
- 7. NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
- 8. Republikaner
- 9. No party
- 10. Other party [write in]
- 11. Don't know

- "The AfD is an alternative for all those who no longer feel at home in the politically established parties"
  - 1. Agree completely
  - 2. Agree somewhat
  - 3. Disagree somewhat
  - 4. Disagree completely
- "How much would you say that politicians care what people like you think?"
  - 1. Not at all
  - 2. Very little
  - 3. Some
  - 4. Quite a lot
  - 5. A lot
- "Please tell me how much you personally trust each of the institutions listed below." I trust political parties:
  - 1. completely
  - 2. somewhat
  - 3. not very much
  - 4. not at all
- "Issue deciding vote choice"

Germany is facing a set of different issues, and political parties deal with these issues in different ways. Which of these issues are most important when it comes to deciding which party to vote for during the general election? Please list three issues (Note that the order of issues was randomized across respondents and waves).

- Immigration
- Education
- Pensions
- Health and health insurance
- Crime
- Unemployment
- Environment, climate and energy
- Terrorism
- Rising prices, rising cost of living, inflation
- Economic situation

- Construction of housing
- Gender equality
- Foreign policy
- Income inequality/social equality
- Other [write in]
- Don't know
- "Issue allocation for vote choice" for three issues picked.

And how important is each issue when it comes to deciding your vote choice? If you had a total of ten points to allocate across the issues that you just selected, how would you allocate the points? The more points you allocate to an issue, the more important the issue is to you.

• "Issue fit" for three issues picked.

And how well do you think the following parties represent your views on these issues? Use a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means that the party does not represent your views at all on an issue and 100 means the party represents your views very well.

- CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich Soziale Union)
- SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
- AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)
- Die Linke
- Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
- FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands)
- "Attitude toward refugee policies"

Now we will ask you a few additional questions about refugees in Germany, a topic on which there are many different opinions. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? "The number of refugees should be reduced."

- 1. Strongly agree
- 2. Agree
- 3. Disagree
- 4. Disagree strongly

## B Design of Conjoint Experiment

#### B.1 Experimental Design

Our conjoint experiment prompt was worded as follows

Here are four hypothetical candidates for the Bundestag. Please choose the candidate you would be most likely to vote for if the election was held next Sunday. Also, rank each candidate overall on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 meaning you strongly disapprove of the candidate and 7 meaning you strongly approve of the candidate. Please note that the candidates are similar except for the attributes below.

Each respondent saw five screens. Four profiles with eight attributes were shown on each screen. The first attribute, Party, was fixed on all screens as Die Linke, SPD, CDU, and AfD, both to avoid confusion and to allow each respondent to choose an option from one of these four parties on every screen. Among the remaining 7 attributes, the first three rows (Experience, Reason for running, and Chance of winning) were shown in the same order. However, levels in each factor are randomized. The order and levels of the four remanining rows were randomized. In order to maintain realistic profiles, we imposed randomized restrictions; for example, AfD candidates could not have previously served for several terms in the Bundestag and could not propose to accept all or 500,000 refugees per year, as this would not produce a plausible profile. Complete details on our randomization restrictions are reported in the following table.

Factor	Levels	Note
Experience		
	(1) In Bundestag for the first time	
	(2) Previously served one term in Bundestag	D 4 75
-p e	(3) Previously served for several terms in Bundestag	Do not assign to AfD
Reason for running		
	(1) Because politics too often ignores ordinary citizens (2) To continue to serve his party	
	(3) To participate in policymaking	
Chance of winning	[3] To participate in policymaking	Half of the screens should show this at-
Chance of winning	(1) This candidate is expected to win the support of many voters	tribute for one candidate and the other
	and could possibly enter the Bundestag	half should show this attribute for two
	(2) This candidate is expected to win the support of few voters	candidates. A maximum of two can-
	and will probably not enter the Bundestag.	didates should have this attribute for
	r ,	any screen.
Refugee policy		
	(1) There must be a complete stop to the arrival of refugees	
	(2) There should be an annual upper limit of 200,000	
	(3) There should be an annual upper limit of 500,000	Do not assign to AfD
	(4) There should not be a limit to the number of refugees	Do not assign to AfD
Border policy		
	(1) The German border police should be allowed to use	Do not assign to SPD
	gun violence against refugees who come to Germany illegally	Do not design to SI D
	(2) The German border police should not be allowed to use	
DELETE DESERTE	gun violence against refugees who come to Germany illegally	
Pension Policy	(1) Has paid much attention to the question of how to	
	(1) Has paid much attention to the question of how to sustainably secure pensions and the pension level	
	(2) Has not paid much attention to the question of how to	
	sustainably secure pensions and the pension level	
Tax Policy		
	(1) The top tax rate for the rich must increase	Do not assign to CDU
	(2) The top tax rate for the rich should stay the same	Do not assign to Die Linke
	(3) The top tax rate for the rich should be decreased	Do not assign to Die Linke and
	•	SPD

Table B: Factors and Levels with Randomization Restrictions.

## B.2 Example




Figure B: Conjoint Experimental Design

#### C Robustness Checks

#### C.1 Survey Weights

We estimated sampling weights to adjust for the difference between the data used in the conjoint analysis and a nationally representative sample. The weights adjust the sample to the demographic distributions of Germany as derived from the European Social Survey (Round 8, released on 30th of May 2018, weighted by its sampling weights) in terms of gender, age and education. In particular, we use entropy balancing<sup>23</sup> to compute sampling weights that make the weighted sample marginals close to the population marginals for the three variables (gender, age, and education). Then, we computed the difference between our main results reported in the paper and the results from weighted samples. The results are substantively similar for all main results reported in Figures 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 without using these weights.




Figure C.1.1: Difference Between Weighted and Unweighted Results for Figure 4.




Figure C.1.2: Difference Between Weighted and Unweighted Results for Figure 5.




Figure C.1.3: Difference Between Weighted and Unweighted Results for Figure 6.




Figure C.1.4: Difference Between Weighted and Unweighted Results for Figure 8.




Figure C.1.5: Difference Between Weighted and Unweighted Results for Figure 9.

#### C.2 Scale as Dependent Variable

The following analyses correspond to Figures 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9, though with the dependent variable as a candidate's rating on the 1-7 scale, rather than the probability that he is chosen. We find similar results when using this dependent variable. See figure captions for details.




Figure C.2.1: Causal Effects of AfD Candidate Attributes on AfD Candidate Rating Among AfD Voters. This figure replicates Figure 4. The results are substantively identical when using the scale as the dependent variable. Again, the refugee policy has the largest effect; the proposed tax policy also has a large effect.




Figure C.2.2: Causal Effects of AfD Candidate Attributes on AfD Candidate Rating Among AfD Voters, Interacted With Status Quo. This figure reproduces Figure 5. We find similar interactions between the Status Quo variable, on the one hand, and the chance of winning and proposed refugee policy attributes, on the other hand.




Figure C.2.3: Causal Effects of Refugee Issue Positioning on AfD Candidate Rating Among AfD Voters. This figure replicates Figure 6. We find that, while the AfD refugee policy has a large effect on the AfD candidate rating, the other candidates' positions do not have a similarly large effect. This contrasts with Figure 6, where the dependent variable was the choice probability (which is zero-sum).




Figure C.2.4: Causal Effects of Economic Issue Positioning on AfD Vote Choice Among AfD Voters. This figure replicates Figure 8. Restricted policies are denoted by gray italicized labels. To ensure realistic profiles, we do not vary tax positions of Die Linke.




Figure C.2.5: Causal Effects of Refugee Issue Positioning on Candidate Ratings Among AfD Voters. This figure shows the effect of refugee issue positions on candidate ratings among AfD voters. Each coefficient quartet corresponds to one of four models having the candidate rating (Die Linke, SPD, CDU, and AfD) as the dependent variable and the refugee policy positions as the independent variables. We find that proposing a ban results in a large, significant increase in the average candidate rating from AfD voters.




Figure C.2.6: Causal Effects of Refugee Policies on Ratings From Own Voters. This figure reproduces Figure 9. Again, here we show that parties are penalized by their own voters for proposing a refugee ban.

#### C.3 Heterogeneous Effect Analyses

In Figure 6, the average impact of refugee policies is large, but could also mask important treatment heterogeneity. In particular, a relevant source of heterogeneity is the degree of voters' trust in political parties. If AfD supporters are anti-establishment voters and genuinely distrustful of established parties, rather than expressing dissatisfaction simply because those parties don't meet their issue preferences, they should not be swayed by changes in issue positions. Yet, we found surprisingly little variation in the magnitude of the effects of refugee policy positions by political trust. In Figure C.3.1, we show that AfD voters who express "no trust in parties" or think that "politicians don't care about people like me" are as willing to switch their vote to these parties when they appeal to them on the basis of issues.




Figure C.3.1: Subsetting by "No trust in political parties" and "Politicians don't care about people like me."

#### D Characteristics of AfD and Other Voters

#### D.1 Demographic and Ideological Predictors of AfD Voting

As previous research has shown, radical right voters in Europe tend to be disproportionately male and less educated. Using logistic regression, we find similarly that being female and years of education are negatively correlated with AfD support in Germany (See Column 1 of Table D.1.1). We further find that AfD supporters are younger and more likely to be from East Germany. We do not find evidence of a correlation with income, although this variable has a relatively high proportion of missingness (9.70%). Conversely, self-rated socioeconomic status, which has less missingness, has a negative bivariate relationship with AfD support and a curvilinear relationship, consistent with the argument of Gidron and Hall (2017), although the squared term is not statistically significant. Lastly, workers are more likely to support the AfD relative to white-collar employees.

We also examined the ideological predictors of AfD voting, focusing on three areas in particular: affective attitudes towards the AfD, attitudes towards other parties in Germany and politics in general, and lastly views about refugees. Each of these areas are measured by four, two, and ten items, shown below. Because the questions in these batteries are highly intercorrelated, we constructed a summary scale from the first principal component of the AfD and refugee attitudes.<sup>24</sup> We entered the refugee scale along with the demographic predictors in the multivariate probit model in Column 2 of Table D.1.1, then the political attitudes in Column 3, and lastly all variables together in Column 4.

Unsurprisingly, we find that AfD voters hold significantly more negative views of refugees than non-AfD voters. While the relationship between the refugee scale and AfD voting is no longer significant after we account for political attitudes (Column 4), the two scales are highly correlated with each other ( $\rho = 0.75$ ), meaning that AfD voters' positive views towards their party are closely related to their opinions of refugees. Lastly, we find that individuals who mistrust political parties in Germany are also significantly more likely to vote for the AfD.

#### Statements About the AfD

- The AfD is not distancing itself sufficiently from extremist radical right positions.
- I think it's a good thing that the AfD wants to limit the inflow of refugees and migrants to a larger extent than other parties.
- The AfD is an alternative for all those who no longer feel at home in the politically established parties.
- The AfD is the only party that is willing to openly discuss the integration problems of Muslims.

#### **Attitudes Towards Politics**

• How much would you say that politicians care what people like you think?

• Please tell me how much you personally trust political parties.

#### Views About Refugees

- Refugees are integrating well into Germany.
- Refugees who live in Germany permanently should be entitled to German citizenship.
- The number of refugees should be reduced.
- More is being done for refugees than for native Germans.
- Refugees should be willing to give up much of their culture of origin and instead adopt German culture.
- Refugees are good for the German economy.
- Refugees increase crime.
- The inflow of refugees increases the risk of terrorism.
- The inflow of male refugees makes it more difficult for native men to find female partners.
- The inflow of young male refugees makes it more difficult for young native men to find apprenticeships and jobs.

	Voted	for AfD Ca	ndidate or	Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age (logged)	0.439**	0.065	-0.245	-0.254
	(0.183)	(0.228)	(0.295)	(0.295)
Female	-0.166	-0.215	$0.057^{'}$	0.051
	(0.110)	(0.132)	(0.168)	(0.168)
East German	0.340**	0.410**	0.400*	0.413*
	(0.144)	(0.173)	(0.233)	(0.233)
Years of Education	-0.070***	$-0.035^*$	$-0.041^*$	$-0.041^*$
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Socioeconomic Status	-0.300**	0.129	0.438**	0.446**
	(0.152)	(0.180)	(0.217)	(0.217)
Socioeconomic Status <sup>2</sup>	0.018	-0.014	-0.040**	-0.041**
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Retired	$-0.281^*$	-0.104	0.060	0.064
	(0.166)	(0.196)	(0.251)	(0.251)
Unemployed	0.140	0.271	1.036**	1.029**
	(0.305)	(0.376)	(0.471)	(0.471)
Unskilled Worker	$0.493^{**}$	0.165	0.281	0.267
	(0.226)	(0.280)	(0.327)	(0.328)
Skilled Worker	$0.347^{*}$	0.093	0.275	0.271
	(0.188)	(0.225)	(0.281)	(0.281)
Refugee Scale		$0.974^{***}$		0.070
		(0.049)		(0.071)
AfD Statements Scale			1.844***	1.791***
			(0.099)	(0.111)
Politicians Care			-0.087	-0.073
			(0.123)	(0.124)
Trust in Political Parties			$0.595^{***}$	$0.574^{***}$
			(0.123)	
Constant	-1.324			
	(0.839)	(1.031)	(1.421)	(1.422)
N		2,772		
Log Likelihood	-1,137.630			
AIC	2,297.259	1,580.512	1,018.560	1,019.570

<sup>\*</sup>p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Table D.1.1: Logistic Regression Model of AfD Voting.

#### D.2 "Always-AfD" and "Never-AfD" Voters

This section examines the "Always-AfD" ("Never-AfD") voters in our sample – the respondents who voted for the AfD in the 2017 September elections and who chose the hypothetical AfD candidate in all five (zero) screens. For these voters, the estimated effects of all seven attributes for all four hypothetical candidates is zero; that is, there is no configuration of attributes that dissuades these voters from choosing the AfD candidate.

Logistic regression models predicting Always- and Never-AfD voting are shown in Tables D.2.1 and D.2.2, respectively. We find that that the strongest demographic predictor of being an Always-AfD voter, relative to an AfD voter that occasionally chooses a different candidate, is being male. Turning to the attitudinal measures, we find that Always-AfD voters hold more anti-refugee attitudes and pro-party attitudes than even other AfD voters. Interestingly, we do not find much evidence that anti-establishment attitudes are predictive of Always-AfD voting once refugee opinions and attitudes towards the party are taken into account. Our results suggest that Always-AfD voting may be driven more by positive affect towards the party and extreme xenophobic preferences rather than by anti-establishment voting per se.

Turning to the model of Never-AfD voting in Table D.2.2, we find that, aside from assessments of the AfD itself, views about refugees are the only significant predictor of "Never-AfD'ers." Indeed, among respondents with warmer-than-average values on the refugee scale, more than 90% are Never-AfD'ers, compared to about half of those with cooler-than-average values. We conclude that, when Germans have positive views about refugees, it is very unlikely that they will ever consider voting for AfD candidates, irrespective of these candidates' positions on other issues.

	DV: 1 if R	espondent	Chooses A	AfD in All 5 Screens
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age (logged)	0.332	0.143	0.109	0.089
, , ,	(0.383)	(0.400)	(0.400)	(0.410)
Female	-0.500**	-0.541**	$-0.404^{*}$	$-0.429^*$
	(0.214)	(0.220)	(0.223)	(0.226)
East German	-0.287	-0.203	-0.345	-0.269
	(0.281)	(0.289)	(0.291)	(0.294)
Years of Education	0.015	0.018	-0.001	0.006
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Socioeconomic Status	-0.449	-0.295	-0.297	-0.262
	(0.274)	(0.286)	(0.285)	(0.292)
Socioeconomic Status <sup>2</sup>	0.046*	0.032	0.031	0.029
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Retired	-0.104	0.037	-0.017	0.047
	(0.318)	(0.326)	(0.327)	(0.330)
Unemployed	-0.976	-0.830	-0.738	-0.660
	(0.671)	(0.688)	(0.686)	(0.690)
Unskilled Worker	0.329	0.381	0.466	0.460
	(0.403)	(0.422)	(0.422)	(0.430)
Skilled Worker	0.166	0.263	0.191	0.246
	(0.341)	(0.354)	(0.355)	(0.361)
Refugee Scale		0.444***		0.286**
		(0.099)		(0.112)
AfD Statements Scale			0.914***	0.683***
			(0.191)	(0.211)
Politicians Care				0.102
				(0.173)
Trust in Political Parties				0.036
				(0.175)
Constant	-0.795	-1.673	-2.542	-3.081
	(1.685)	(1.766)	(1.809)	(1.963)
N	417	417	417	417
Log Likelihood	-266.993	-255.522	-252.930	-249.489
AIC	555.987	535.044	529.860	528.979

<sup>\*</sup>p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Table D.2.1: Logistic Regression Model of "Always-AfD" Voting.

	DV: 1 if F	Respondent	Chooses A	AfD on 0 Screens
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age (logged)	0.374	0.676	0.631	0.723
,	(0.574)	(0.587)	(0.594)	(0.605)
Female	0.031	0.118	-0.101	-0.017
	(0.318)	(0.325)	(0.327)	(0.337)
East German	-0.286	-0.437	-0.327	-0.413
	(0.440)	(0.454)	(0.456)	(0.461)
Years of Education	0.012	0.007	0.029	0.026
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.047)
Socioeconomic Status	0.599	0.433	0.473	0.454
	(0.496)	(0.484)	(0.505)	(0.503)
Socioeconomic Status <sup>2</sup>	-0.054	-0.040	-0.044	-0.043
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Retired	-0.278	-0.437	-0.389	-0.435
	(0.500)	(0.511)	(0.519)	(0.519)
Unemployed	0.674	0.390	0.446	0.422
	(0.703)	(0.751)	(0.724)	(0.741)
Unskilled Worker	0.623	0.559	0.511	0.517
	(0.517)	(0.530)	(0.536)	(0.546)
Skilled Worker	-0.661	-0.727	-0.723	-0.701
	(0.642)	(0.645)	(0.652)	(0.656)
Refugee Scale		-0.393***		$-0.233^*$
		(0.117)		(0.136)
AfD Statements Scale			-0.779***	
			(0.189)	(0.217)
Politicians Care				-0.173
				(0.262)
Trust in Political Parties				-0.027
				(0.259)
Constant	-5.098*	$-4.853^{*}$	-3.989	-3.741
	(2.683)	(2.679)	(2.706)	(2.869)
N	417	417	417	417
Log Likelihood	-145.655	-140.048	-137.387	-135.871
AIC	313.311	304.096	298.773	301.742

<sup>\*</sup>p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Table D.2.2: Logistic Regression Model of "Never-AfD" Voting.

## D.3 Additional Analyses




Figure D.3.1: Conjoint Choice Frequencies by Party Label and Vote.

	AfD Only		Politicians		Little Trust	
	Alternative		Don't Care		in Parties	
	Est.	SE.	Est.	SE.	Est.	SE.
Sep. 2016	49.83	0.06	82.15	0.04	86.10	0.04
Jan. 2017	48.93	0.06	81.47	0.04	80.56	0.04
Jun. 2017	47.23	0.06	78.53	0.05	77.74	0.05
Dec. 2017	48.36	0.06	78.19	0.05	74.69	0.05

Table D.3.1: Change in Attitudes Among Respondents Who Say Parties Aren't Listening on Refugees. This table shows the proportion of respondents who hold anti-establishment attitudes among those who said that parties do not tend to listen or do not listen at all on the refugee issue in Wave 1 of our survey in Sep. 2016. In general, the proportion who hold the anti-establishment view decreases over time.

	Party Label					
	Die Linke	SPD	CDU	AfD		
Baseline: C	Complete ba	n on refu	gees			
Allow 200k	0.031***	0.054***	$0.020^{*}$	-0.003		
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.007)		
Allow $500k$	0.019	$0.023^{*}$	0.024**			
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)			
Allow all	-0.004	0.011	-0.003			
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)			
Constant	0.231***	0.341***	0.220***	0.166***		
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)		
N	15,095	15,095	15,095	15,095		

Table D.3.2: Voter-Average Treatment Effects of Refugee Policies (OLS). By showing the average treatment effect of refugee policies among all voting respondents, this table demonstrates that the prospective gains from proposing a refugee ban are outweighed by the losses, particularly when compared to upper limits of 200,000 or 500,000. Because the target population consists of all voters, we incorporate survey weights.

## E Effects of Changes in Pensions and Taxes on Own Supporters




Figure E.1: Causal Effects of Economic Positions on Vote Choice by Own Supporters. This figure plots the AMCE of each party's pension/taxation policies on their own supporters. The reference policy is set to each party's status quo policy. For example, when the SPD candidate proposes increased taxation on the rich, SPD voters are about 8 percentage points more likely to support him, relative to the SPD's status quo position of maintaining taxes on the rich.

## F Evidence of Underreporting of AfD Support

We do not find compelling evidence that AfD supporters strongly underreported their vote intention in our survey: In fact, at the national level, self-reported AfD vote intention in the fourth panel wave (which contained our conjoint experiment) was 0.3% points higher than the actual election result of 12.7% (Figure F.1). At the state level, we find evidence of underreporting in just two of 16 states (Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt), where self-reported vote intention in Wave 4 was significantly lower than the state-level election result (Figure F.2). Respondents from these states represent 6% (184 / 3083) of our Wave 4 sample.




Figure F.1: No Evidence of Underreporting of National AfD Support. This figure plots the difference between the actual AfD vote share in the 2017 German parliamentary elections (12.7%) and self-reported intention to vote for the AfD in each wave of our panel. In Wave 4, containing our conjoint experiment, there was no significant difference between AfD vote intention and the actual AfD vote share.




Figure F.2: State-by-State Evidence of Underreporting of AfD Support. This figure reproduces Figure F.1 across each of Germany's 16 states. There is no significant difference between the state-level election result and self-reported AfD vote intention in 14 of 16 states. We do find evidence of underreporting in two states, Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt, where vote intention was significantly lower than the actual election result.